



HOW COMMON ARE THE VALUES 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION?
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.
These values are common to the Member States in a society 
in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.
1 Europe’s values: the rise to prominence
When the foundational principles or values of the European Union 
were penned down in Article 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon, they seemed to be 
rather self-evident, and the conventionnaires in the constitutional con-
vention that ﬁ rst drafted the provision as well as the Member States 
in the consecutive Intergovernmental Conferences rallied around them 
without too much discussion.1 Many commentators at the time consid-
ered Article 2 TEU to be little more than a political and symbolic provi-
sion, despite its formal foundational character.2 The main bone of con-
tention during the convention was whether or not the Preamble to the 
Constitutional Treaty should contain a reference to Europe’s Christian 
heritage, which was eventually left out. With respect to what is now Ar-
ticle 2 TEU, there was broad consensus on the more political values of 
‘freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms and the rule of law’. There was less agreement, however, on the 
inclusion of ‘ill-deﬁ ned notions’ such as solidarity and equality which, 
according to the President of the convention, would be hard to enforce. 
In the end, a compromise was found to distinguish between the found-
ing values of the Union (human dignity, liberty, democracy, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights), and more societal values (tolerance, 
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equality and solidarity). The IGC would add to the proposal of the con-
vention the values of pluralism, justice and non-discrimination. In the 
ﬁ nal Lisbon version, ‘liberty’ was exchanged for ‘freedom’, and ‘equality’ 
for ‘equality between men and women’.
Article 2 TEU was broadly considered to be conﬁ rmation of a factual 
situation, describing the type of regime the European Union was and 
is to be, as well as the type of societies it seeks to govern: the Union is 
modelled after the example of its Member States, a democratic system 
governed under the rule of law, that respects human rights, and gov-
erns societies that cherish pluralism, tolerance and equality. It was, in a 
sense, an expression of the self-perception of the Union, a description of 
its identity. Today, the picture is very different. The values mentioned in 
Article 2 TEU have come to play a prominent role in the public discourse 
on European integration. They are mobilised in an unprecedented man-
ner, both by the European Union and its Member States, including those 
that allegedly infringe them.3
2 ‘Common’ no longer: values under siege
At the same time, infringements of these values seem to be rising, 
and the EU institutions have begun to act in order to protect them.4  The 
Article 7 TEU procedure − long considered the nuclear option and not to 
be used in reality − has been opened against two Member States.5 Arti-
cle 2 TEU has also made it to the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, despite the fact that many originally believed that they 
were non-justiciable and that safeguarding them would be entrusted to 
the political bodies and the Member States.6 The CJEU now draws on 
them when interpreting EU law, and has operationalised Article 2 TEU 
3 On increasing references to ‘European values’, their appropriation by diverse groups of 
actors and their impact on public action, see François Foret and Oriane Calligaro (eds), Eu-
ropean Values: Challenges and Opportunities for EU Governance (Routledge 2018).
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other countries. See, among many others: A von Bogdandy and Pal Sonnevend, Constitu-
tional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and 
Romania (Hart 2015); C Closa and D Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in 
the European Union (CUP 2016); A Jakab and D Kochenov (eds), The Enforcement of EU Law 
and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (OUP 2017); Wojiech Sadurksi, Poland’s 
Constitutional Breakdown (OUP 2019); and the many blogposts and newspaper and journal 
articles on the issue.
5 The European Parliament adopted its Resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal 
calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU), the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on 
which the Union is founded. Hungary has, by the way, challenged the validity of the resolu-
tion. See Case C-650/18 Hungary v European Parliament (pending). 
6 See, eg, Opinion 2/13; Case 64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses 
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by qualifying Article 19 TEU as giving expression to the values of rule of 
law in Article 2 TEU.7 The Commission has begun to bring enforcement 
actions against Member States for infringements of the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights, something it has resisted for a long time.8 
More generally, we are witnessing a decline of compliance with the 
values of democracy, rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights 
throughout Europe. Europe is not spared from the global retreat from 
democracy and rule of law.9 The same is the case for the infringement of 
fundamental rights. In several countries, the problems go well beyond 
the occasional infringement of fundamental rights or reasonable dis-
agreement on what these values require in speciﬁ c cases. Systematic 
infringements of the ECHR and, more importantly, deﬁ ance of the judg-
ments of the ECtHR are not exceptional. 
More worrying even than the increased violations of the foundational 
values is the fact that the Article 2 TEU values − and I here limit myself to 
democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights − are no longer self-evident. 
They no longer go unchallenged.10 In a growing number of circles the values 
of Article 2 TEU are openly challenged. Conceptions on democracy, rule of 
law, fundamental rights and liberty as well as the relations between them 
are changing across Europe (and worldwide, for that matter). Democracy, for 
instance, is more and more seen as rule by the majority, neglecting or deny-
ing the rights of minorities, while compromise is increasingly considered a 
sign of weakness. Trust in the media, (certain) universities, (foreign) NGOs, 
courts and independent agencies − all of which are essential in well-func-
tioning constitutional democracies − are under siege. Even long-standing 
democracies are shaken by populist political forces.11 
When it comes to the rule of law, courts and judicial systems have 
been targeted in many countries. There is a trend of challenging courts 
as counter-majoritarian bodies, and their decisions are increasingly 
viewed as illegitimately interfering with the political. One need only re-
7 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (n 6) para 32; Case C-619/18 Commission v 
Poland. 
8 Mark Dawson and Elise Muir, ‘Individual, Institutional and Collective Vigilance in Pro-
tecting Fundamental Rights in the EU: Lessons from the Roma’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 751 
and ‘Hungary and the Indirect Protection of EU Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law’ 
(2013) 14 GLJ 1959.
9 See, eg, Freedom House, Democracy in Retreat: Freedom in the World 2019, available at 
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-re-
treat> accessed 29 November 2019.
10 See, eg, Mark A Graber, Sanford Levinson and Mark Tushnet (eds), Constitutional De-
mocracy in Crisis? (OUP 2018); J Rupnik, ‘The Crisis of Liberalism’ (2018) 29 Journal of 
Democracy 24; Ryszard Legutko, The Demon in Democracy: Totalitarian Temptations in Free 
Societies (Encounter 2016).
11 Cas Mudde, The Far Right Today (Polity 2019). 
Xcall the headlines in some British newspaper when the Supreme Court 
handed down its decision in Miller, speaking of the ‘enemies of the peo-
ple’, or, even more worrying, the reaction of Trump to judicial decisions 
that get in the way of his policies. 
Likewise, human rights are no longer self-evident and are seen 
as ‘leftist hobbies’, as instruments in the hands of identity or minori-
ty groups using the court rooms to interfere with political decisions in 
sensitive and societally divisive issues.12 The courts protecting and en-
forcing human rights are accused of interfering with politics, or, when it 
comes to European courts, with the sovereignty of nation states. 
These trends which exist everywhere in Europe seem to gain more 
traction in the new democracies in East Central Europe. It is well known 
that Orban has openly declared that he is striving for alternative values, 
has openly disavowed liberalism,13 and stated that ‘the era of liberal de-
mocracy is over’.14 The attack on the rule of law seems to be ampliﬁ ed 
in East Central Europe, where ‘law’ and the ‘rule of law’ have for a long 
time been viewed with suspicion in the ﬁ rst place.15 It should come as 
no surprise that the ‘rule of law’ is not always automatically embraced.16 
At the same time, and perhaps surprisingly, the relevant regimes 
usually do not disavow the language of democracy, rule of law and fun-
damental rights even if they sometimes explicitly disavow liberalism and 
the protection of speciﬁ c rights and speciﬁ c groups of people, and they 
remain eager to be recognised as proper (or even the only ‘true’) democra-
cies.17 They retain institutions and procedures which are commonly as-
12 In the US, a Commission for Unalienable Rights was established in order to reconsider 
human rights and return to their true meaning, which in the words of Mike Pompeo should 
lead to distinguish ‘veritable’ unalienable rights and ‘ad hoc rights granted by governments’. 
A letter in response to this commission asking for it to be disbanded, signed by 400 NGOs 
and former senior government ofﬁ cials, can be found at <www.humanrightsﬁ rst.org/sites/
default/ﬁ les/Unalienable-Rights-Commission-NGO-Ltr.pdf> accessed 29 November 2019. 
13 On that concept, see, eg, Andras Pap, Democratic Decline in Hungary Law and Society in an 
Illiberal Democracy (Routledge 2018); critical of the concept: Jan Werner Muller, ‘Democracy’ 
Still Matters’ The New York Times (New York, 5 April 2018). The concept was coined by Fareed 
Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’ (1997) 76(6) Foreign Affairs 22 to denote regimes that 
combine the presence of free and fair elections with the absence of constitutional liberalism. 
14 Marc Santora and Helene Bienvenu, ‘Secure in Hungary, Orban Readies for Battle with 
Brussels’ The New York Times (New York, 11 May 2018).
15 See, eg, the contributions in Wojciech Sadurski, Adam Czarnota and Martin Krygier 
(eds), Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law? The Impact of Enlargement on the Rule 
of Law, Democracy and Constitutionalism in Post-communist Legal Orders (Springer 2006). 
16 See, eg, Martin Mendelski, ‘Europeanization and the Rule of Law: Towards a Pathological 
Turn’ (2016) 40 Southeastern Europe 346; and his ‘The Rule of Law’ in Adam Fagan and Petr 
Kopecký (eds), The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics (Routledge 2017) ch 8. 
17 Orban claims to be the only real defender of Christian democracy, which he opposes 
to liberal democracy. See, eg, Marc Plattner, ‘Illiberal Democracy and the Struggle on the 
Right’ (2019) 30(1) Journal of Democracy 5. 
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sociated with robust constitutional democracies: constitutional courts, 
judicial councils, elections, political rights, even if they restrict the me-
dia, capture the judiciary, and repress civil society, thereby rendering 
elections neither free nor fair, even if there is no ballot stufﬁ ng on the day 
of the vote). But these bodies have to a large extent been captured by the 
ruling parties, and no longer perform their functions as should be the 
case in robust liberal democracies governed under the rule of law. 
3 Are these values really ‘common’? 
The values mentioned in Article 2 TEU are not just European valu-
es: they are also considered to be values that are common among the 
Member States. The fact that the values are considered common is im-
portant and serves several purposes. First, it links European funda-
mental values to those of the Member States, thus ensuring continuity. 
Membership of the Union does not entail a breach with national funda-
mental values, especially those which are in many states considered to 
belong to the ‘constitutional identity’ (understood as the immutable core 
of the constitution): democracy, respect for fundamental rights, rule of 
law, liberty. Indeed, many Member States’ constitutions explicitly declare 
their foundational values or principles, often including the principles of 
rule of law, democracy and respect for fundamental rights, the principle 
of sovereignty, a reference to the form of government (republic, unitary 
or federal), and most often in the opening articles of the Constitution. 
These are often considered to form the immutable core or the ‘identity’ of 
the Constitution, often protected against constitutional amendment. The 
values that the Union is based on according to Article 2 TEU are in fact 
very similar to those that the Member States are based on. 
The reference to common values is also an expression of the fact that 
the Member States are like-minded nations (to use the phrasing of the 
ECHR), which adhere to the same values, and which distinguish them 
from other states which may not. The reference is then, to use the vocab-
ulary of the Venice Commission, to a ‘European constitutional heritage’. 
It is thus a statement, so to speak, of the European identity as a common 
identity: the European Union and its Member States stand for these val-
ues, and this is what distinguishes them from other states.
4 Or are they Western values? 
But are the common European values really common? Or are they re-
ally Western values, originating in the Western European Member States 
which are now being imposed on East Central European countries? 
It is a fact that the foundational values of the Union and the condi-
tions for membership were expressed rather late in the process of Eu-
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ropean integration, in the wake of the accession of the post-communist 
states. When ‘values talk’ really took off in the European Union in the 
1990s and early 2000s, one of its aims was to make explicit the implicit 
values that had always been presumed common to the European Union 
and shared among its members, and which distinguished the EU from 
other parts of the world. Europe had been searching for its soul and a 
narrative to explain its raison d’être to its citizens, to the Member States 
and to the outside world, but little had been achieved.18 In the early 
1970s, in the midst of the Cold War, the Member States of the European 
Communities did try to formulate a ‘European identity’, based on the 
values that they shared, and that they wanted to develop further, defend, 
and which they wanted to espouse in their relations to the world.19 But 
the values and principles that the Member States must be committed to 
in order to be able to join, the conditions for membership, were not well 
developed. There was rather a common, be it implicit, understanding of 
how constitutional liberal democracies are supposed to work. 
The need to make the fundamental values and conditions for mem-
bership explicit became acute after the fall of the wall and in light of the 
imminent accession of former communist countries, states that had not 
been governed under these principles for a long time. They were formulat-
ed by the existing − Western − Member States of the Union in the Copen-
hagen political criteria for membership, on the basis of their experiences. 
When Article 2 TEU was drafted, the EU had 15 members, the states that 
are now referred to as the ‘Old Member States’ or the Old Europe, to distin-
guish them from the so-called New Member States joining in 2004, 2007 
and 2013 (sometimes referred to as the ‘New’ or ‘the Other Europe’). 
Yet, when the countries in East Central Europe sought accession, 
it was clear that they wanted to absorb those values that had ﬁ rst de-
veloped in the West. There was an expressed will of the East Central 
European and other candidate countries to ‘return to Europe’, and the 
majority in the East Central European States found it natural to model 
their own systems on Western European systems that they saw to be 
functioning successfully.20 This is for instance expressed in the 1991 
Visegrad Declaration21 and is evidenced by their accessions to the Coun-
18 On the history of the conditions for membership and political conditionality until the 
1970s, see Ronald Janse, ‘The Evolution of the Political Criteria for Accession to the Euro-
pean Community, 1957−1973’ (2018) 24(1) ELJ 57. 
19 Copenhagen Declaration 1973.
20 See Wojciech Sadurski, ‘EU Enlargement and Democracy in the New Member States’ in 
Wojciech Sadurksi, Adam Czarnota and Martin Krygier (eds), Spreading Democracy and the 
Rule of Law? The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Rule of Law, Democracy and Constitution-
alism in Post-communist Legal Orders (Springer 2006) 29. 
21 Declaration on Cooperation between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of 
Poland and the Republic of Hungary in Striving for European Integration, 15 February 1991. 
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cil of Europe and ODHIR. The acceding Member States chose to join or-
ganisations that would demand compliance with the values of democra-
cy, rule of law, respect for fundamental rights and minorities, pluralism 
and tolerance.22 Importantly, the values to be absorbed in the context of 
accession were not presented as those of the EU-15 or of one or more of 
the Old Member States, but as European values. The notion of ‘common 
constitutional principles’ and European values may indeed once have 
been modelled after Western European traditions, but they were meant 
to be shared and shaped also by the New Member States. 
Nevertheless, the chosen process of returning to Europe was essen-
tially a process of imitating the West.  It was perceived by many − and 
perhaps even more so today − as a process of ‘absorbing imposed West-
ern values’, which are not necessarily shared on the ground in the new 
Member States. As Krastev and Holmes have put it: 
What makes imitation so irksome is not only the implicit assumption 
that the mimic is somehow morally and humanly inferior to the model. 
It also entails the assumption that Central and Eastern Europe’s copy-
cat nations accept the West’s right to evaluate their success or failure 
at living up to Western standards. In this sense, imitation comes to feel 
like a loss of sovereignty.23 
Moreover, the process of Europeanisation in itself did not always 
comply with the principles to be adopted: the acquis as such was non-ne-
gotiable, and the candidate Member States, their parliaments and voters 
had only a limited say over the substance of the legislation they were re-
quired to transpose into their national system. This also included social 
legislation for which there was little support in society, including legisla-
tion protecting common European values, such as equality. As Krastev 
has noted, ‘The European Union and the external constraints that it 
imposed on the accession countries contributed to the perception of the 
transition regimes as “democracies without choices”, and thus fueled the 
current backlash against consensual politics’.24 The process by which 
the common values were introduced did not fully respect these values in 
the candidate states. 
The choice was not necessarily made by all in the post-communist 
countries. The process of ‘Europeanisation’ can be seen as an effort by 
22 As is also emphasised by the CJEU in Case C-619/18 Commission v Poland (retirement 
of Supreme Court Judges) para 42: ‘the European Union is composed of States which have 
freely and voluntarily committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 
TEU’ (emphasis added).
23 Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes, ‘Imitation and Its Discontents’ (2018) 29(3) Journal 
of Democracy 117.
24 Ivan Krastev, ‘The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus’ (2007) 18(4) Journal of De-
mocracy 56, 59. 
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domestic post-communist reformers to import liberal-democratic insti-
tutions, adopt Western political and economic frameworks, and publicly 
embrace Western values, in view of accession and literally becoming part 
of Europe.25 But it also caused serious rifts in their societies, and win-
ners and losers of change.26
It should come as no surprise, then, that the post-1989 settlement 
has − with all it has achieved − also contributed to creating a sense of 
resentment, against the domestic liberal elite that made the choice for 
a return to Europe, and against the EU as the embodiment of Western 
liberal values. The appeal of (Western) liberal democratic values in East 
Central Europe is declining, if only because the Western liberal-dem-
ocratic states are facing their own internal crises in the form of rising 
populism and general discontent with the elites. Be that as it may, this 
may explain why East Central Europeans may now feel that they are 
now being judged by standards that are not their own, and which they do 
not necessarily agree with. They question liberal values and formulate 
alternative ‘ideologies’, thus denying that ‘Western’ values such as those 
expressed in Article 2 TEU as understood by the EU and the Old Member 
States provide the model to which all societies must conform. 
5 Common values, national identity and exclusive competences of 
the Member States
This raises the question whether the Union should allow for diver-
sity when it comes to compliance with the foundational values. It has 
been argued that the EU should not interfere with these issues which 
essentially pertain to national sovereignty, and that it should accept that 
Member States differ also in their understanding of the fundamental val-
ues. The interference of the Union in these matters, then, is challenged on 
two grounds: lack of competence and failure to respect national identities. 
The ﬁ rst claims that the constitutional set-up of the States belongs to 
the exclusive competences of the Member States and that the EU should 
not meddle in sovereign affairs. Thus, for instance, in the infringement 
actions concerning the Supreme Court and the retirement of judges, the 
Polish Government argued that the organisation of the national justice 
system pertains to the competences reserved exclusively to the Member 
States and that the EU cannot arrogate competences in that domain.27 
25 Ivan Krastev, ‘The Metamorphosis of Central Europe (2019) Project Syndicate, 21 Janu-
ary 2019.
26 See, eg, John Feffer, Aftershock. A Journey into Eastern Europe’s Broken Dreams (Zed 
Books 2018). 
27 Case C-619/18 Commission v Poland (Supreme Court) judgment of 24 June 2019, para 
38; Case C-192/18 Commission v Poland (retirement of judges) judgment of 5 November 
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The Court of Justice swiftly rejected that claim with reference to its settled 
case law that even when exercising reserved competences the Member 
States still have to comply with their obligations under EU law, including 
Article 19 TEU, which ‘gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of 
law afﬁ rmed in Article 2 TEU’. All Member States must therefore always 
comply with the obligation to ensure that the courts and tribunals which 
may be called upon to act as European judges are independent. The fact 
that, generally speaking, the organisation of the judiciary indeed belongs 
to the powers reserved to the Member States does not prevent the Court 
of Justice from reviewing that EU law is complied with. In this case, the 
Court could interfere because the Court interpreted Article 19 TEU as 
giving concrete expression to the value of rule of law laid down in Article 
2 TEU. One may wonder whether the Court would also be able to interfere 
in other instances of reserved competences, where a State acts in deﬁ ance 
of Article 2 TEU, and where there is no parallel to Article 19 TEU giving 
concrete expression to the values of Article 2 TEU. 
The second ground focuses on the diversity between the Member 
States and the duty imposed on the Member States to respect the na-
tional identities of the Member States. Thus, in its White Paper on the 
Reform of the Judiciary, the Polish Government extensively referred to 
Article 4(2) TEU to defend its right to introduce its own sovereign insti-
tutional solutions concerning the judiciary.28 ‘The Treaty on European 
Union safeguards constitutional identity of the member states as their 
exclusive national competence, which means that reforms of the judicia-
ry should be assessed at the national level by competent authorities’, the 
Government claimed. Yet, even so, even the Polish Government admitted 
in the next sentence that: 
This is not to say that Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union does 
not apply to judicial reforms in the Member States. Violation of judicial 
independence is a red line that cannot be crossed when it comes to the 
principle of the rule of law understood as an element of European values. 
This seems to be the correct approach. There has always been a lot of 
room for variation in the constitutional structures of the Member States, 
and we see this in practice. National systems vary widely in the design 
of the state: some are monarchies, other republics, some are centralised, 
others are federal or regionalised, some have a constitutional court safe-
guarding constitutional rights, and others do not; they differ in terms of 
their judicial systems, the appointment of judges, the voting system, and 
so forth. This may be referred to as the principle of constitutional indif-
2019, para 93. 
28 Para 176.
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ference or constitutional agnosticism of the EU: to a large extent, the EU 
is indifferent to the constitutional structures of the Member States. And 
in the exercise of its competences, the EU must under Article 4(2) TEU 
respect these structures, which may be seen as expressing the national 
identities of the Member States and must always comply with the values 
of Article 2 TEU.29 
European Union law thus allows for a lot of national diversity in 
the institutional structures of the Member States, and it accepts wide 
diversity in the organisation of the judiciary. But it does not accept such 
diversity with respect to compliance with the foundational values of Ar-
ticle 2 TEU. Compliance with the foundational values may take different 
shapes, and it is ﬁ rst and foremost a matter for the Member States who 
in principle retain exclusive competence in these matters, resulting in 
great variation among the Member States in terms of constitutional and 
political structures. But despite this variation, all must at the end of the 
day comply with the common values of Article 2 TEU and it is a matter 
of common concern that they are indeed complied with. So, variation is 
possible as to the form, but not in terms of substance. 
This is where the challenge ahead lies: to deﬁ ne what the concrete 
standards are by which the diverging national institutional structures 
are to be measured, especially when the link with EU law is tenuous, 
and where there is little agreement on common standards. The Rule of 
Law Review Cycle proposed by the Juncker Commission in the summer 
of 2019 may well provide a framework to make the values more concrete 
and operational.30 It is to be hoped that the von der Leyen Commission 
takes up the gauntlet. 
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